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McNaghten Rules OK? The Need for
Revision of the Automatism and Insanity
Defenses in English Criminal Law
R.D. Mackay*
I. Introduction
There has been a resurgence of interest in the codification of
"craziness" both in the United States and in England. Most recent
legislative reforms in the United States have followed in the wake of
the jury's verdict in the Hinckley case,1 whilst in England renewed
interest in revising the insanity defense has been prompted by a re-
port to the Law Commission" on the codification of the criminal law.
The purpose of this article is first to briefly review relevant reforms
in the United States; second to critically analyze the present legal
position in England; third to discuss English reform proposals; and
finally to offer some alternatives to revising the automatism and in-
sanity defenses.
Perhaps more than any other area of the criminal law the in-
sanity plea generates heated discussion and debate. This has little to
do with the frequency with which the defense is used, which in Eng-
land is virtually never at all s and in the United States only rarely.
4
* Visiting Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law; Senior Lecturer in Law,
Leicester Polytechnic Law School, England; Fulbright Scholar.
The following article is an expanded version of a paper given during the 1986 W.G. Hart
Legal Workshop at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London entitled "Craziness and
Codification - Revising the Automatism and Insanity Defences," see pp. 109-121 of Criminal
Law and Justice (Sweet & Maxwell, England 1987) ed. l.H. Dennis. Much of the expansion
resulted from an informal faculty presentation given at the University of Arizona College of
Law in February 1987.
1 wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the Fulbright Commission for their continued sup-
port during my visit to the U.S.A. and to the Dickinson School of Law, both faculty and
students, for providing me with such an excellent and intellectually stimulating working envi-
ronment. I also wish to express my special thanks to my research assistant Kathleen Harring-
ton whose comments and intellectual support have been of immeasurable value.
1. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For detailed analysis see P.W. Low, J.C. JEFFRIES
AND R.J. BONNIE, THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY
DEFENSE, (1986).
2. CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: A REPORT TO THE LAW COMMISSION (Law
Comm'n No. 143) (1985). The Law Commission was established by the Law Commissions
Act 1965 (1965 c.22) "for the purpose of promoting the reform of the law" and consists of a
chairman and four other Commissioners appointed by the Lord Chancellor. In the case of this
particular report, however, the work was "subcontracted" to four academic lawyers.
3. The Criminal Statistics: England and Wales consistently reveal that the insanity de-
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Instead, the discussion tends to be initially based upon the funda-
mental question of whether it is morally proper to excuse mentally
abnormal persons from the penal consequences of their actions,
which but for their mental conditions would be adjudged criminal.
In short, is the insanity defense essential to the moral integrity of the
criminal law?
5
II. The United States
Clearly in the United States some states have given a negative
answer to this question' having, mainly in the light of the Hinckley
case, decided to abandon the insanity defense and substitute a 'mens
rea' approach. This is currently the position in Montana,7 Idaho,'
and Utah9 where the state legislatures have enacted provisions ren-
dering evidence of a defendant's mental condition inadmissible in
support of an insanity defense and instead restricting such testimony
to the issue of 'mens rea.' If the defendant is convicted his mental
state must be considered by the court before sentence in order to
decide the appropriate form of punishment or disposal. The Supreme
Court of Montana in State v. Korell,10 has upheld the constitutional-
ity of this type of measure, although to date the United States Su-
preme Court has not addressed the issue. Clearly, the 'mens rea' ap-
proach restricts the acquittal of a mentally ill defendant to "those
cases where the defendant at the time of the offense was so seriously
mentally ill that he did not have the requisite intent or state of mind
required to commit an illegal act."1 Thus, the mens rea test is simi-
fense is only pleaded successfully in one or two cases each year, see e.g. the 1983 Statistics
(Cmd. 9349).
4. See H. Steadman, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS 58-71
(1985), which reveals that the defense is raised in less than 2% of federal and state trials with
approximately a 30% success rate. See further, B.D. SALES AND T. HAFEMEISTER, EMPIRICISM
AND LEGAL POLICY ON THE INSANITY DEFENCE ch. II (Mental Health and Criminal Justice
ed. 1984); Pasewark, A Review of Research on the Insanity Defence, 484 ANNALS 100-114
(1986); Steadman & Morrissey, The Insanity Defence: Problems & Prospects for Studying
the Impact of Legal Reforms, 484 ANNALS 115-126 (1986); MYTHS AND REALITIES: A RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 14-15 (1983).
5. For an excellent article in support of the insanity defense, see Morse, Excusing the
Crazy: The Insanity Defence Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1985).
6. See generally N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982) for some of the
most influential arguments favoring abolition of the insanity plea.
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201, 46-14-301 (1985). These sections allow for the jury
to return a verdict of guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of lack of mental state. Com-
ment After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity Defence in Montana, 45 MONT. L.
REV. 133 (1984).
8. IDAHO CODE, tit. 18 § 207, tit. 19 §§ 714, 1715 (Supp. 1983) (the only verdicts
provided for by the statute are guilty or not guilty); see Geis and Meier, Abolition of the
Insanity Plea in Idaho: A Case Study, 477 ANNALS 72, 76. "The aim is to distinguish testi-
mony bearing on legal responsibility from that concerned with moral blameworthiness. A de-
fendant will be examined before trial, however, to determine if he is fit to proceed to trial."
9. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-305, 77-35-21 (Supp. 1986).
10. 690 P.2d 992 (1984).
II. Brooks, The Merits of Abolishing the Insanity Defence, 477 ANNALS 125, 131.
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lar to the first limb of the McNaghten Rules and has been criticized
as being too restrictive "since in most cases the 'actus reus' and
'mens rea' doctrines and defenses other than insanity will fail to ex-
cuse even the craziest defendant." 2 Instead, it is argued that the
proper "criteria for excuse is that the actor is nonculpably lacking
either reasonable rationality or is compelled.
'13
The Hinckley case has led to a series of alternative measures
being enacted in the United States. At least twelve states have
passed statutes providing for an alternative verdict of "guilty but
mentally ill."'" This type of measure appears to be designed to offer
a compromise to the jury whenever a defendant pleads insanity. He
may be found "guilty but mentally ill" provided the judge or jury
find "that the defendant (i) is guilty of the offense charged, (ii) was
mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and (iii) was
not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense."
15
Once this verdict is returned the court can then sentence the defend-
ant in the same way as if an ordinary conviction had been returned
and if psychiatric treatment is required then this may follow. How-
ever, this new verdict has been strongly criticized 6 as confusing to
juries1 7 and as a retrograde step in that it may allow for some seri-
ously mentally ill persons to be sent to prison where treatment facili-
ties are inadequate or lacking altogether. In addition, although one
of the underlying purposes behind the new verdict was an attempt to
reduce the number of persons found "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity," this has not happened since it would appear "that the dis-
placement in disposition is from the guilty to the GBMI popula-
tion."16 Despite these and other' 9 criticisms this particular measure
12. Morse, supra note 5, at 802. See also S.J. BRAKEL. J. PARRY & B.A. WEINER, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 717 (American Bar Foundation, 3d ed. 1985).
13. Id. at 790.
14. Blunt and Stock, Guilty but Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict," 3 BEHAVIOURAL
SC. AND THE LAW 49 (1985); McGraw-Ferthing-Capowich & Kirlitz, The "Guilty But Men-
tally Ill" Plea & Verdict: Current State of the Knowledge, 30 VILL L. REV. 117-91 (1985).
15. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1059 (1985).
16. See generally Fentiman, Guilty but Mentally IL: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26
B.C. L. REV. 601 (1985); Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time
Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494-527 (1985); Herman & Sor, Convicting
or Confining? Alternative Directions in Insanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus
New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquittees, 3 B.Y.U. L. REV. 499-638 (1983).
17. There is an inevitable overlap between the definitions contained in the verdicts lead-
ing to guilty but mentally ill and not guilty by reason of insanity and it is difficult to see how a
jury can truly differentiate between the two, see Fentiman, supra note 16, at 635; Hermann &
Sor, supra note 16, at 571; Note, Indiana's Guilty But Mentally Ill Statute: Blueprint to
Beguile the Jury, 57 IND. L.J. 639, 639-46 (1982).
18. Blunt and Stock, supra note 14, at 63. See also Smith & Hall, Evaluating Michi-
gan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 J. L. REFORM 77 (1982).
19. Blunt & Stock, supra note 14. See also MORRIS, supra note 6, at 83, Morse, supra
note 5, at 803; Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Critical Analysis, 14 RUTGERS LJ. 453
(1983); Slobogin, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have
Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494 (1985); Britton, Adopt Guilty But Mentally Ill? No!, 15
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has so far survived constitutional challenge20 and may be on the
increase.
21
Another type of measure in the United States has been the en-
actment of a new form of insanity defense. This has taken the form
of a move away from the volitional tests, especially that originally
proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI), 22 towards a tighten-
ing up of the insanity defense.28  Ironically, the much criticized
McNaghten test 24 has re-emerged as influential. Thus, the federal
law was altered by the Insanity Defense Reform Act 19845 which
enacts a new test 26 that is something of a cross between McNaghten
and the cognitive branch of the ALI by providing a defense if the
defendant "as a result of a severe mental disease or defect was una-
ble to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts." It is also provided that the burden is upon the defendant to
prove his insanity "by clear and convincing evidence. "27
U. TOL. L. REV. 203 (1983); Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill - Impractical Alternative to the
Insanity Defense, 14 Sw. U. L. REv. 544 (1984); New York Times, Aug. 5, 1982, at 29, col.
3.; Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (1983).
20. A recent example of this is to be found in the Court of Appeals of Alaska's decision
in Hart v. State, 1985 Ala. Adv. Sh. 482, 702 P.2d 651 (1985), where it was held that the
adoption of a new state insanity defense, eliminating irresistible impulse and creating a new
verdict of Guilty but Mentally Ill, is not unconstitutional.
21. In 1982, approximately two dozen states were considering the insanity plea. N.Y.
Times, June 24, 1982, at D21, col. I. Also, Press, The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEWSWEEK,
May 24, 1982, at 56. Slobogin states ". . . at least twelve states have adopted some version of
the verdict and perhaps twenty others have considered or are considering similar statutes."
Supra note 19, at 496.
In Britton, Adopt Guilty But Mentally Ill? No!, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 203 (1983) it is
indicated that the following states have considered and rejected the GBMI "test": Ala., H.B.
55, 2nd Spec. Sess. (1982); Fla., H.B. 55-H, H.B. 56 and S.B. 130 (1982); Hawaii, H.B. No.
86, S.B. No. 2841-82 and S.B. No. 2272-82 (1982); Iowa, H.F. 2220, 1982 Gen. Assem.;
Kan., S.B. 502 (1982); Mo., H.B. 1157, H.B. 1436 and S.B. 718, 81st Gen. Assem. (1982);
N.J., A-290, N.J. Leg. (1982); Ohio, H.B. 1005, S.B. 148, 114th Gen. Assem. (1982); Tex.,
H.B. 964, 67th Leg. (1981); Va., H.B. 598, H.B. 948 (1982); Wis., A.B. 765 (1981 Leg.).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 provides: "A person is not responsible for criminal con-
duct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law."
23. It is worth noting that the ALl test was used in the Hinckley case and resulted in his
being found "not guilty by reason of insanity," a verdict which one would have thought is more
likely to have been returned under the volitional limb of the test. See P.W. Low. J.C. JEFFRIES
& R.J. BONNIE, supra note 1, at 120-122.
24. The test is
...that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
(1843) 10 Cl and F. at 210; [1843-60] All E.R. 229 at 233.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 1984).
26. There have been a spate of similar proposals. For example, the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the American Psychiatric Association have both recommended a test based upon a
proposal made by Bonnie, the basis of which is that "as a result of mental disease or mental
retardation he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the
offence." See Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defence, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 197 (1983).
27. Other states which have altered the burden of proving insanity by placing it upon
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Finally, in California the ALl test has been abandoned in fa-
vour of an apparently conjunctive McNaghten test which provides
that the accused must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature
and quality of his or her act AND of distinguishing right from
wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. '2 8 Although the
test was approved by the electorate after a referendum, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court recently field in People v. Skinner,2 9 that the
new test must be read in the disjunctive, as creating two distinct and
independent limbs upon which an insanity plea may be based. The
reasons for this rather remarkable decision appear to be that the
court considered first that if the new test was indeed conjunctive
then it might be so strict as to be unconstitutional and second that in
any event the use of the word "and" instead of "or" was likely to
have been the result of a draftsman's error. Similarly, Alaska also
repealed the ALl test in 1982 but replaced it with a test which is
restricted to the first limb of the McNaghten Rules. The new test
provides "In a prosecution for a crime, it is an affirmative defense
that when the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the de-
fendant was unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to ap-
preciate the nature and quality of that conduct."30 To date, this lim-
ited test has survived constitutional challenge.3 1
III. England
A. The Present Law
English law continues to adhere to the McNaghten Rules, the
essentials of which are:
that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.3
2
the defense rather than the prosecution are for example: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-502(B) (1985) (burden on defendant by clear and convincing evidence); Indiana, IND.
CODE § 35-41-4-1(b) (1986) (burden on defendant by prepondernace of the evidence); Iowa,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (Supp. 1983) (burden on defendant by preponderance of the evi-
dence); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 315(a) (Purdon's 1984) (burden on defendant
by preponderance of the evidence); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 4801(b) (1986) (burden
on defendant by preponderance of the evidence).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (1987) (emphasis added).
29. 39 Cal.3d 765, 704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985). For comment see Califor-
nia Insanity Statute: The People's Will or the Supreme Court's? 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 627
(1986); see also People v. McCowan, 182 Cal. App.3d 189, 227 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1986).
30. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (Supp. 1986).
31. Hart v. State, 1985 Ala. Adv. Sh. 482, 702 P.2d 651 (1985).
32. (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200 at 210; [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 229 at 233.
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These rules resulted from the adverse public reaction to the jury's
verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity of Daniel McNaghten after
his trial33 for the murder of the Prime Minister's private secretary.
In many ways, therefore, McNaghten's insanity acquittal, which in
turn led to a tightening up of the insanity defense,"' may be viewed
as an earlier but analogous decision to the Hinckley verdict in the
United States.
The McNaghten case has, naturally enough, attracted a mass of
literature ranging from debate about the proper spelling of his
name 5 to the question of whether he was in truth mentally ill or in
reality a political activist.3" A point of controversy which is perhaps
a little less well known is the fact that there is not even any degree
of certainty as to how many judges concurred in the formulation of
the famous rules.3 7 However, despite all of this historical uncertainty
one thing is clear. The rules themselves have been and continue to be
immensely influential in the common law world.3
So far as England is concerned, they have remained unchanged
33. See 4 St. Tr. N.S. 847 for a full account of the trial of Daniel McNaghten, and R.
MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENCE OF DANIEL McNAUGHTEN
(New York: Free Press 1981).
34. G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 643, n.2 (Stevens, London 2nd ed.
1983) states "Daniel McNaghten was acquitted by the jury, before the formulation of the
rules now associated with his name; but under those rules he should have been convicted." For
a brief judicial analysis of the insanity defense prior to McNaghten see R v. Sullivan [1983] 1
All E.R. 577 at 580 and for detailed historical analysis of pre-McNaghten insanity see Moran,
The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield (1800)
19 L. AND Soc'Y REV. 487 (1985); Moran, The Punitive Uses of the Insanity Defence: The
Trial for Treason of Edward (Oxford (1840), 9 INT'L. J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 171 (1986). In
these articles Moran argues that far from representing an enlightened, humanitarian view of
criminal responsibility the insanity verdict was developed to serve the prosecution's interests of
punishment and incapacitation.
35. See R. MORAN, supra note 33, at XI-XIII and DANIEL McNAUGHTEN: HiS TRIAL
AND ITS AFTERMATH (D.J. West and A. Walker ed. London 1977).
36. See generally, R. MORAN supra note 33.
37, It is generally assumed that all 15 judges were involved but the House of Lords'
record speaks only of II. Apart from Tindal L.C.J. who delivered the collective ruling and
Maule J. who dissented we cannot now be sure who the others were. See, The Judges Respon-
sible for the Rulings in McNaghten's case, 57 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 315 (1983).
38. So far as the United States is concerned, with the exceptions of New Hampshire and
Alabama, the Rules were the test of criminal responsibility in all states until 1954. At present,
the following states accept them in one form or another: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010
(1984); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-502(A) (Supp. 1986); California, CAL. PENAL CODE §
25(b) (1987); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1984); Florida, Anderson v. State, 276
So.2d 17 (1973); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-702 (1983); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4
(Supp. 1986); Kansas, State v. Smith, 223 Kan. 203, 574 P.2d 548 (1978); Louisiana, LA.
REV. STAT. § 14.14 (1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (1987); Mississippi, Hill
v. State, 339 So.2d 1382 (1976); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.030 (Supp. 1987); Ne-
braska, State v. Myer, 205 Neb. 867, 290 N.W.2d 660 (1980); Nevada, NEV. CODE § 194.010
(1986); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (1982); New Mexico, Uniform Jury Instruction
of N.M. § 41.01 (1978); North Carolina, State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510
(1979); Oklahoma, OKLA. CODE tit. 21 § 152 (Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18 § 315 (Purdon's 1984); South Dakota, S.D. COD. LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2 (18A) & § 22-5-10
(Supp. 1986); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01 (Supp. 1987); Virginia, Davis v. Common-




since their inception in 1843. To date they have sustained constant
criticism including three official reports, each of which has recom-
mended their total abrogation."9 Not only that, the rules are quite
unique as a source of English law. There has been nothing like them
before or since. What, it may be asked, gives these rules the power
of law in England? They were not adopted by Parliament in any
statute and were certainly not the direct product of judicial proceed-
ings, being merely answers given by the judiciary to hypothetical
questions. Nonetheless, they have been applied so often and for so
long that they unquestionably form a part of the common law of
England and must be accepted as such.
In England there has been no recent support for an abolition of
the insanity defense.4 0 Unlike the position in the United States, how-
ever, where the scope and use of the insanity plea has been the sub-
ject of trenchant criticism,4 to some extent the opposite has oc-
curred there. Instead, a primary dissatisfaction in England stems
from the fact that the insanity defense is so little used.' 2 Two of the
most important reasons for the demise of the insanity defense in
England have been, first, the introduction in 1957 of a separate di-
minished responsibility plea which, if successful, reduces murder to
manslaughter and, second, the "bizarrely inflexible disposal conse-
quences"43 following an insanity "acquittal."" Because of their sig-
39. They are: First, in 1923 the ATKIN COMMITTEE ON INSANITY AND CRIME (Cmd.
2005) which recommended that the defendant should not be held responsible, "when the act is
committed under an impulse which the prisoner was by mental disease in substance deprived
of any power to resist." Second, in THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Cmd.
8932) 1953 which suggested that the best course would be to "leave the jury to determine
whether at the time of the act the accused was suffering from disease of the mind (or mental
deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible." Finally, the BUTLER
REPORT (Cmd. 6244) in 1975 adopts a different approach which is explained at a later stage
in this article.
40. THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDERS, (Cmd.
6244) at para. 18.10 was clearly of the opinion that the defense ought to be retained and
endorsed the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment's (Cmd. 8932 1853) p. 278 reaffirma-
tion of "the ancient and humane principle .... that if a person was at the time of his unlaw-
ful act mentally so disordered that it would be unreasonable to impute guilt to him, he ought
not to be held liable to conviction and punishment under the criminal law."
41. See MORRIS, supra note 6 and also W.J. WINSLADE AND J.W. Ross, THE INSANITY
PLEA 20 (1983) where a series of cases, including Hinckley, are reviewed in an attempt to
show "how and why the insanity plea defeats justice, discredits psychiatry and enrages the
public."
42. The Criminal Statistics of England and Wales referred to above at note 3 confirm
that the insanity defense in England is only pleaded successfully each year on one or two
occasions. These statistics do not cover cases where the defense is pleaded unsuccessfully.
However, it seems highly likely that this figure is also minimal, see, e.g., MACKAY, THE ROLE
OF PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS IN THE CROWN COURT TRIAL PROCESS (Leicester Polytechnic Law
School Monographs 1986) where during a two year research study in a busy English criminal
court dealing with all indictable cases where defendants had been psychiatrically investigated,
not a single insanity plea, successful or unsuccessful, was encountered,
43. Dell, Wanted.- An Insanity Defence that Can be Used, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 431, 437.
44. There is only one form of disposal which is under section 5 Criminal Procedure
(Insanity) Act 1964 (c. 84) and entails indefinite confinement in a special mental hospital. For
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nificance, both of these interconnected reasons deserve further
consideration.
The English plea of diminished responsibility is contained in
section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 5 which provides:
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another
he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from
such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes
or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his
mental responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being
a party to the killing.
Although this plea is only available in murder prosecutions its effect
has been to reduce the practical importance of the defense of in-
sanity to virtual redundancy. The reasons for this are not hard to
find. First, even before the passing of section 2 the insanity defense
was rarely relied on outside of murder cases." Second, the wording
of section 2 is a great deal wider than the McNaghten Rules and
encompasses mental conditions which would clearly not fall within
the Rules' confines.47 Finally, and perhaps most important, a man-
slaughter conviction avoids the mandatory penalty of life imprison-
ment attached to a murder conviction and gives the judge complete
discretion over sentencing, 48 including the option of a hospital or-
der. In contrast to this, a successful insanity "acquittal" leaves the
judge no such discretion but instead brings with it automatic deten-
tion in a mental hospital for an unpredictable length of time. Small
wonder, therefore, that even before the 1957 Act, the insanity de-
fense was restricted to murder, as the prospect of indefinite commit-
ment to a top security mental hospital was viewed as much less de-
sirable than the normal punishment for all other crimes. It follows,
therefore, that in murder cases as of 1957 "there is every incentive
for those who represent accused persons to prefer the diminished re-
sponsibility to the insanity defence" 50 with the result that in some
this reason the special verdict is described by Dell, supra note 43, at 432, as "the psychiatric
equivalent of a life sentence."
45. Homicide Act 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11).
46 A major reason for its use was to escape the death penalty, but with the passing of
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 (c. 71) even this incentive disappeared.
47. For a full analysis of the scope of "abnormality of mind" within diminished responsi-
bility see S. DELL, MURDER INTO MANSLAUGHTER: THE DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY DEFENCE
IN PRACTICE 33-40 (Oxford University Press England 1984).
48. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 692 who gives examples of several cases demon-
strating that the range of sentencing includes suspended prison sentences and even probation in
appropriate circumstances.
49. Hospital orders are given under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983
(c. 20). For detailed research into their use in diminished cases, see S. DELL, supra, note 47, at
8-24. The 1983 Criminal Statistics (Cmd. 9349) reveal that out of 69 successful diminished
pleas there were 30 hospital orders and eight probation/supervision orders.
50. S. DELL, supra note 47, at 30. In support of this contention the author continues
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instances defendants prefer to plead guilty to manslaughter rather
than be the subject of a special insanity "acquittal."
This reprehensible state of affairs has also been starkly demon-
strated within the defense of automatism which in English criminal
law is a plea based on "unconscious involuntary action" 51 and re-
flects an increasing awareness by the courts of the practical need for
a voluntary act before an accused can be convicted of a criminal
offense. This particular area of the law continues to cause considera-
ble problems to the English courts.5 2 A major source of difficulty has
stemmed from the fact that a successful automatism plea may result
in an unqualified acquittal. For obvious social defense reasons this
has been a source of considerable worry to the courts and in order to
restrict the availability of such acquittals, the judiciary has devel-
oped a complex body of law built upon the phrase "disease of the
mind" within the McNaghten Rules. At the root of this development
has been the division of automatism into two types; namely, sane and
insane. The basis of this division is that if the defendant's automatic
actions are found to have been the result of a disease of the mind
then the only defense available is one of insanity with automatic
commitment to a mental hospital. If, on the other hand, the defend-
ant's unconscious actions were caused by some condition other than
a disease of the mind, then his automatism plea is of the sane variety
and will, if successfully pleaded, mean outright or ordinary acquittal.
This dichotomy can be traced to the decision of Devlin J in R. v.
Kemp 8 where a wide definition of what constitutes "disease of the
mind" was felt to be necessary in order to ensure the compulsory
hospitalization, by means of the special verdict, of an accused suffer-
ing from arteriosclerosis. Such an approach has since been fully en-
dorsed by the House of Lords in Bratty v. Attorney General for
Northern Ireland4 and more recently in R. v. Sullivan.5 The facts
Certainly in the present research the contents of the psychiatric reports not in-
frequently suggested that men pleading guilty to diminished responsibility man-
slaughter were in fact mad, according to the McNaughten Rules, and for 6 per
cent of the section 2 sample of 253 men there was actually evidence in the
records that one or more of the examining doctors had regarded the defendant
as falling within the scope of the McNaughton Rules.
51. Per Viscount Kilmuir LC in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland (1963)
A.C. 386, 401.
52. For discussion of some of the problems both in England and other Commonwealth
jurisdictions see, e.g., Mackay, Non-Organic Automatism - Some Recent Developments,
1980 CRIM. L. REV. 350; Mackay, Intoxication as a Factor in Automatism, 1982 CRIM. L.
REv. 146; Fairall, Automatism, 5 CRIM. L. J. 335 (1981); Fairall, Automatism, Irresistible
Impulse & Mental Disease, 5 CRIM. L.J. 136 (1981); Leigh, The Supreme Court of Canada &
The Development of the Criminal Law, 15 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REv. 23 at pp. 25-36 (1986);
Lederman, Non-Insane & Insane Automatism: Reducing the Significance of a Problematic
Distinction, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 819-37 (1985); Holland, Automatism & Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 25 CRIM. L.Q. 95-128 (1982).
53. [1957] Q.B. 399 at 406.
54. [19631 A.C. 386.
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of the latter case were that the defendant was charged with assault-
ing a friend. At his trial he claimed that the assault had been com-
mitted whilst he was in the final stage of recovering from a minor
epileptic seizure. The defendant had been a lifelong sufferer of epi-
lepsy and the undisputed medical evidence at the trial supported the
fact that the defendant had indeed suffered from such a seizure, the
effect of which would have been lack of memory and unconscious-
ness of what had occurred during the relevant time. The trial judge
ruled that epilepsy is a "disease of the mind" and that therefore the
defense amounted to one of insane rather than sane automatism.
Consequently, if the jury accepted this defense they would be re-
quired to return a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Not unnaturally, the defendant was advised to change his plea to one
of guilty and so a conviction was recorded for which he was sen-
tenced to three years' probation with a condition of medical treat-
ment. The accused later appealed on the ground that the trial judge
ought to have left the defense of non-insane automatism to the jury.
The Court of Appeal 6 and the House of Lords both held that the
trial judge had been correct in his ruling and dismissed the appeals.
In speaking for a unanimous House of Lords, Lord Diplock was ada-
mant in concluding that the special verdict was appropriate if an
offense was committed during or immediately after an epileptic fit
whilst the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding
were temporarily suspended. Relying on R. v. Kemp,5 7 his Lordship
concluded
58
The nomenclature adopted by the medical profession may
change from time to time; Bratty was tried in 1961. But the
meaning of the expression "disease of the mind" as the cause of
"a defect of reason" remains unchanged for the purposes of the
application of the McNaghten Rules . . . 'mind' in the
McNaghten Rules is used in the ordinary sense of mental facul-
ties of reason, memory and understanding. If the effect of a dis-
ease is to impair these faculties so severely as to have either of
the consequences referred to in the latter part of the rules, it
matters not whether the aetiology of the impairment is organic,
as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself is
permanent or is transient and intermittent, provided that it sub-
sisted at the time of the commission of the act. The purpose of
the legislation relating to the defence of insanity . . . has been
to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous conduct.
The duration of a temporary suspension of mental faculties of
55. [1983] 2 All E.R. 673.
56. [1983] I All E.R. 577.
57. [1957] Q.B. 399.
58. [1983] 2 All E.R. at 677-678.
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reason, memory and understanding, particularly if, as in the ap-
pellant's case, it is recurrent, cannot on any rational ground be
relevant to the application by the courts of the McNaghten
Rules . . . it is natural to feel reluctant to attach the label of
insanity to a sufferer from psychomotor epilepsy of the kind to
which the appellant was subject, even though the expression in
the context of a special verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity is a technical one which includes a purely temporary and
intermittent suspension of the mental faculties of reason, mem-
ory and understanding resulting from the occurrence of an epi-
leptic fit. But the label is contained in the current statute, it has
appeared in this statute's predecessors ever since 1800. It does
not lie within the power of the courts to alter it. Only Parlia-
ment can do that. It has done so twice; it could do so again.
What the case manifestly demonstrates, therefore, is the over-
whelming need for statutory change. At the conclusion of his judg-
ment in the Court of Appeal, Lawton LJ claimed that the trial
judge's acceptance of a guilty plea was "merciful" and had "enabled
justice to be done."" Nothing, of course, could be further from the
truth. In effect, the appellant had been "forced" to plead guilty to an
offense, even though at the time of its commission all concerned ac-
cepted that he was not criminally responsible. Such a position is
quite untenable and does no credit to the criminal law.
Although Sullivan was not considered an appropriate occasion
for exploring possible causes of non-insane automatism, Lord
Diplock nevertheless commented that the defense would be available,
". ***in cases where temporary impairment not being self-induced
by consuming drink or drugs, results from some external physical
factor such as a blow on the head causing concussion or the adminis-
tration of an anaesthetic for therapeutic purposes." 60 Lord Diplock's
dictum makes it clear that in his opinion the paramount require-
ments of a defense of non-insane automatism are that the impair-
ment is purely temporary and that it is attributable to "some exter-
nal physical factor." Thus, although Mr. Sullivan's epileptic state
satisfied the first of these conditions, it failed to satisfy the second
and thus, in law, constituted a disease of the mind within the
McNaghten Rules.
The distinction between insane and non-insane automatism ac-
cepted by Lord Diplock in R. v. Sullivan 1 is neither clear nor satis-
factory. Its presence is to a large extent dictated by a conflict be-
tween the need for public protection and a natural reluctance to
59. [19831 1 All E.R. at 582.
60. [1983] 2 All E.R. at 678.
61. id.
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label defendants as legally insane. The dilemma is admirably
summed up by Lawton LJ in R. v. Quick,62 where the Court of Ap-
peal was called upon to decide whether a diabetic who had suffered
from a hypoglycemic episode should be regarded in law as suffering
from a "disease of the mind." Whilst addressing this problem his
Lordship remarked:
[Quick] may have been at the material time in a condition of
mental disorder manifesting itself in violence. Such manifesta-
tion had occurred before and might recur. The difficulty arises
as soon as the question is asked whether he should be detained
in a mental hospital? No mental hospital would admit a diabetic
merely because he had a low blood sugar reaction; and common
sense is affronted by the prospect of a diabetic being sent to
such a hospital when in most cases the disordered mental condi-
tion can be rectified quickly by pushing a lump of sugar or a
teaspoonful of glucose into the patient's mouth.6"
In order to ensure, therefore, that common sense should not be af-
fronted, the Court of Appeal ruled that Quick's mental condition
"was not caused by his diabetes but by his use of the insulin pre-
scribed by his doctor. Such malfunctioning of mind as there was,
was caused by an external factor and not by a bodily disorder in the
nature of a disease which disturbed the working of his mind."164 It
followed that Quick's defense was one of non-insane rather than in-
sane automatism.
Clearly, the court's ruling in Quick equates with Lord Diplock's
remark in R. v. Sullivan when he referred to non-insane automatism
requiring some "external physical factor such as a blow on the head
or the administration of an anaesthetic for therapeutic purposes.
'65
However, it is by no means certain how this so-called "external fac-
tor doctrine" will develop nor how much emphasis should be placed
on the word "physical" as a possible means of further restricting the
scope of non-insane automatism. Some examples of the difficulties
likely to be encountered within this area of the law may be given in
order to demonstrate the unsatisfactory nature of the insane/non-
insane automatism dichotomy. An obvious and yet not uncommon
problem concerns sleepwalking, which prior to R. v. Sullivan had
been regarded in law as a form of non-insane automatism resulting
in some cases in an unqualified acquittal. 6 Such a result may now
no longer be possible owing to the lack of any external factor in
62. [1973] 3 All E.R. 347.
63. Id. at 352.
64. Id. at 356.
65. 11983] 2 All E.R. at 678.




cases of somnambulism.67 In short, sleepwalkers may now risk an
insanity verdict or be compelled to plead guilty where formerly the
law was benign enough to acquit. A second problem concerns the use
of the word "physical" in Lord Diplock's dictum. For example, in
the case of R. v. Bailey, " decided some ten years after R. v. Quick,69
the defense once again was that of automatism on the part of a dia-
betic caused by hypoglycemia. The explanation for the hypoglycemia
was "failure to take sufficient food following his last dose of insu-
lin."17 Apart from the fact that in both Quick and Bailey the diabe-
tes is an "internal" organic disorder which necessitates doses of insu-
lin 7 1 the additional difficulty in the latter case is that it was the
failure on the accused's part to take food within a short period after
insulin treatment, which was the immediate cause of the hypoglyce-
mia. Such a failure seems unlikely to be regarded as an external
"physical" factor, in which case whilst Quick's condition is not in
law a "disease of the mind," Bailey's could be so regarded. Although
it has to be conceded that in the latter case the issue of insanity was
never raised, which again, of course, is understandable if only for the
common sense reasons already referred to.
As a final example of the difficulties engendered by the external
factor doctrine, reference may be made to a series of Canadian cases
dealing with what may be conveniently referred to as psychological
blow automatism. The most important decision within this area is
that of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rabey v. R.72 where it was
held that emotional stress producing automatism, if it was part of
"the ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which are the
common lot of mankind '78 could not be regarded as an external fac-
tor but must instead "be considered as having its source primarily in
the respondent's psychological or emotional make-up" 74 and hence a
"disease of the mind." On the other hand, "extraordinary external
events" of such intensity that they "might reasonably be presumed
to affect the average normal person without reference to the subjec-
tive make-up of the person exposed to such experience"7  might con-
stitute cases of non-insane automatism. This distinction has already
67. Id. Williams remarks, "... since the decision in Sullivan ...it seems very likely
that sleepwalkers will in the future find themselves saddled with an insanity verdict." Id. at
666.
68. [1983] 2 All E.R. 503.
69. [1973] 3 All E.R. 347.
70. [1983] 2 All E.R. at 506.
71. See, e.g., Mackay, Non-Organic Automatism - Some Recent Developments, 1980
CRIM. L. REV. 358, note 48.
72. (1981) 114 D.L.R.3d 193.
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been subjected to considerable criticism 76 and further exemplifies the
complexity of the external factor doctrine. However, the need for a
"physical" external factor appears to have been tacitly endorsed by
Martin JA in the Ontario Court of Appeal when in R. v. Oakley"
he remarked:
Whether there is any evidence of an external cause of a kind
capable of producing non-insane automatism is a question of
law. The only factors relied upon by the judge were either emo-
tional stress caused by his being left alone when his parents
came . . . to visit his brother, the respondent's financial
problems, and the effect of toxic fumes to which the respondent
was exposed in his work with fiberglass or a combination of both
factors. It is clear that the emotional stress of the kind described
was not an external factor sufficient to produce non-insane au-
tomatism. . . .The exposure to toxic fumes could be an exter-
nal cause.7
8
It is not without interest to note the opening comment of Martin
JA's judgment in R. v. Oakley when he said; "This appeal raises
once again the intractable problem of non-insane automatism.
'7 9
The remainder of this article is devoted to proposals which, in part
at least, attempt to resolve some of the intractable difficulties dis-
cussed in this section.
B. Existing Revision Proposals
The most recent proposals in England for revision of the law
relating to automatism and insanity are those contained in the Re-
port of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders published
in 1975, commonly known as the Butler Report.80 Fresh impetus to
these proposals has now been given by the publication in 1985 of the
Law Commission Report on the Codification of English Criminal
Law,81 which in turn contains a detailed reconsideration of the origi-
nal Butler recommendations.8" Most English criminal lawyers accept
that there is a desperate need for flexibility of disposal after a suc-
cessful insanity plea. In that respect the Butler proposals which rec-
ommend such flexibility" have been welcomed.8 4 But at that point
76. See the dissenting opinion of Dickson J in Rabey v. The Queen, id. at 200 and
Mackay, Non-Organic Automatism, supra note 71, at 356.
77. (1986) 24 C.C.C.3d 351.
78. Id. at 362.
79. Id. at 354.
80. Cmd. 6244, chapter 18, 216-240.
81. (Law Comm'n No. 143) H.C. 270.
82. Id. at 102-113.
83. The basic recommendations made by BUTLER relating to disposal are to be found at
paras. 18.42-45 and include absolute discharge in appropriate cases as well as placing the
individual in the community under supervision with power of "recall" to hospital as required.
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consensus ends. Inevitably of major concern has been the proper
scope of any new insanity defense. In this respect the Butler propos-
als have been, to say the least, controversial. For in recommending a
new verdict of "not guilty on evidence of mental disorder," 85 the
Butler Report proposed that this verdict should be available not only
where mental disorder negatives mens rea8" but also in all cases
where the defendant is shown to be suffering from severe mental ill-
ness 8  or severe subnormality. 88
This particular measure is a radical proposal89 since the new
verdict would be available even though the crime could not be shown
to have been in any way influenced by the defendant's condition. The
rationale behind this approach is expressed in the following terms:
"The essence of the formula is that it simply presumes absence of
responsibility when it is established that the accused was suffering
from a sufficiently severe degree of mental disorder at the time of his
act or omission and thus confines argument to a question of fact
which psychiatrists can reasonably be expected to answer."90 The
For detailed argument in favor of these and other BUTLER proposals, see Griew, Let's Imple-
ment Butler on Mental Disorder and Crime C.L.P. 47, at 49 [1984].
84. See. e.g., Griew, id.; Dell, Wanted an Insanity Defence that Can be Used, 1983
CRIM. L. REV. 431.
85. BUTLER REPORT, supra note 80, at para. 18.18.
86. Id. at paras. 18.20-25.
87. The Butler Committee decided not "to equate the definition of severe mental illness
with the concept of psychosis" (para. 18.34) but instead proposed the following complex defini-
tion at para 18.35.
A mental illness is severe when it has one or more of the following
characteristics:-
(a) Lasting impairment of intellectual functions shown by failure of
memory, orientation, comprehension and learning capacity.
(b) Lasting alteration of mood of such degree as to give rise to delu-
sional appraisal of the patient's situation, his past or his future, or that of
others, or to lack of any appraisal.
(c) Delusional beliefs, persecutory, jealous or grandiose.
(d) Abnormal perceptions associated with delusional misinterpreta-
tion of events.
(e) Thinking so disordered as to prevent reasonable appraisal of the
patient's situation or reasonable communication with others.
88. The definition of severe subnormality proposed by the Butler Committee equates
with that originally enacted in the English Mental Health Act of 1959, namely
... a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes
subnormality of intelligence and is of such a nature or degree that the patient is
incapable of living an independent life or of guarding himself against serious
exploitation, or will be so incapable when of an age to do so.
This term should not be confused with the replacement expression "severe mental impairment"
defined in the Mental Health Act of 1983 as "a state of arrested or incomplete development of
mind which includes severe impairment of intelligence and social functioning and is associated
with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person con-
cerned." This new definition was justly felt by the Codification Team in their Report, supra
note 81, at para. 12.8 to be inappropriate in that "exemption from criminal liability on the
ground of severe mental handicap ought not to be limited to a case where the handicap is
associated with aggressive or irresponsible conduct."
89. It is described by the Law Commission Codification Team supra note 81, at para.
12.6 as "controversial."
90. BUTLER REPORT, supra note 80, at para. 18.29.
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Law Commission Codification Team was clearly ambivalent about
this proposal stating that their draft bill could easily be amended to
reflect the view that there ought to be some connection between the
offense and the disorder. 91 This is clearly the prevalent view in the
United States where to date all measures to revise the law since the
jury's verdict in Hinckley have been aimed at restricting the scope of
the insanity plea and endorsing the need for a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's disorder and the alleged offense. Naturally,
the prospect of eradicating the need for any such causal link is ex-
tremely attractive insofar as it "certainly simplifies the tasks of psy-
chiatric witnesses and the court. 92 However, it should not be forgot-
ten that before this newly proposed special verdict could be returned
it would be necessary to prove that the accused was severely men-
tally ill or subnormal at the time of the alleged offense which would
still necessitate a retrospective enquiry into the defendant's mental
condition by psychiatrists. More important the Butler Committee did
acknowledge that:
it is theoretically possible for a person to be suffering from a
severe mental disorder which has in a causal sense nothing to do
with the act or omission for which he is being tried: but in prac-
tice it is very difficult to imagine a case in which one could be
sure of the absence of any such connection.93
Undoubtedly this comment goes to the very heart of the problem
concerning the proper scope of any new insanity defense. For the
crucial question remains as to whether it is appropriate to acquit
someone on the grounds of mental disorder if it can be shown that at
the time of the alleged offense the accused was suffering from a se-
vere form of mental illness which may have had no bearing on the
commission of the offense in question. In this connection the Butler
Report's "presumption of irresponsibility" has been criticized as
"rather weak" for "Might not a person, though suffering from 'se-
vere mental illness,' nevertheless commit a rational crime? Might it
not be demonstrable that he had done so? If so, should he not be
convicted?"' 94 The radical nature of this proposal has caused consid-
erable problems in England over the implementation of the Butler
91. THE CODIFICATION TEAM REPORT supra note 81, remarks at para. 12.6
Some people, however, take the view that it would be wrong in principle
that a person should escape conviction if, although severely mentally ill, he has
committed a rational crime which was uninfluenced by his illness and for which
he ought to be liable to be punished. They believe that the prosecution should be
allowed to persuade the jury (if it can) that the offence and the disorder were
unconnected .... There is undoubtedly force in this point.
92. Id.
93. BUTLER REPORT, supra note 80, at para. 18.29.
94. Griew, supra note 83, at 56. See also, J.C. SMITH AND B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW
181 (Butterworth, London 5th ed. 1983).
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recommendations and not, it is felt, without good cause.
Another difficulty which the Butler Report had to grapple with
was the interrelationship between automatism and insanity. In this
connection their proposals have concentrated upon excluding certain
conditions from the definition of mental disorder in order to retain
the plea of non-insane automatism. The effect of these proposals
would be to restrict the scope of the sane automatism defense
to transient states not related to other forms of mental disorder
and arising solely as a consequence of (a) the administration,
mal-administration or non-administration of alcohol, drugs or
other substances or (b) physical injury. Evidence falling within
this exception would not lead to a special verdict, but would
leave the jury to their normal choice between verdicts of guilty
and not guilty. The exception would cover some of the cases in
which defences of non-insane automatism or based on the intoxi-
cation of the defendant are raised. We make the exception be-
cause we think that it would generally be regarded as strange
and indeed wrong that a person who has committed a criminal
act in a state of confusion following concussion, or when his soft
drink has without his knowledge been laced with alcohol which
caused him to be so drunk that he did not know what he was
doing, or, in the case of a diabetic, when he has failed to take
his insulin, should be described as having been mentally disor-
dered and be subject to any power of control by the court, even
though not mandatory.95
This approach is supported in part by the Law Commission
Codification Team which has recommended that the non-insane au-
tomatism defense be limited to cases of purely transient disorders
which are not associated with any underlying condition that may
cause a similar disorder on another occasion.96 An obvious example
of such a transient disorder would be an isolated blow to the head
causing concussion. Such a temporary disorder of the mind would
undoubtedly continue to qualify as a plea of non-insane automatism
and could result in an outright acquittal. By way of contrast, it is
readily admitted by the Codification Team that "a diabetic who
causes harm in a state of confusion after failing to take his insulin""7
would qualify for the new verdict of not guilty on evidence of mental
disorder, the reason being that his diabetes may cause similar epi-
sodes of confusion on future occasions. 8 The rationale behind this
95. BUTLER REPORT, supra note 80, at para. 18.23
96. CODIFICATION TEAM REPORT, supra note 81, at para. 12.14.
97. Id.
98. See generally, Maher et al., Diabetes Mellitus and Criminal Responsibility 24
MED. SCi. & L. 95 (1984). For detailed medicolegal analysis see Gregory, Diabetes Mellitus
- Current Concepts, I1 LAW. MED. J., 2nd series, 379-551 (1982).
Spring 1987]
184 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
approach stems from the use of the term "non-administration" con-
tained in the Butler Report which is criticized by the Codification
Team in the following manner.
If a disorder of mind occurs because (for example) a medicine is
not taken, the true "cause" of the disorder must be the condition
giving rise to a need for the medicine. That condition may or
may not justify treating the disorder as the occasion for a
mental disorder verdict (see next paragraph). The exclusion of
any disorder caused by the non-administration of any substance
might prevent its being so treated.99
In the next paragraph of its report the Codification Team continues:
We have been unable . . . to distinguish between the different
conditions that may cause repeated episodes of disorder. Nor do
we think it necessary to do so. There is not, so far as we can see,
a satisfactory basis for distinguishing between (say) a brain tu-
mour or cerebral arteriosclerosis on the one hand and diabetes
or epilepsy on the other. If any of these conditions causes disor-
der of the mind (such as an impairment of consciousness) so
that the sufferer does an otherwise criminal act without fault,
his acquittal of the apparent offence should be "on evidence of
mental disorder." Whether a diabetic so affected has failed to
seek treatment, or forgotten to take his insulin, or decided not to
do so, may affect the court's decision whether to order his dis-
charge or to take some other course. There will not, as in the
past, be a mandatory hospital commitment; and the offensive la-
bel of "insanity" will no longer be used. So the verdict should
not seem preposterous in the way that its present counterpart
does.100
At the same time, however, it must be asked whether it is not
only "preposterous" but also unduly harsh to label diabetics as men-
tally disordered. Indeed, the Codification Team seems to concede
this by accepting that although the epileptic automaton would con-
tinue to qualify for a mental disorder verdict, "By contrast, one who
assaults another when in a hypoglycaemic episode of impaired con-
sciousness resulting from insulin treatment" 101 would not, but would
instead "receive an ordinary acquittal." In order to substantiate this
point an illustration is given which states:
There is evidence that D, who suffers from diabetes, had taken
insulin on medical advice. This had caused a fall in his blood-
sugar level which deprived him of control or awareness of his
movements. If D is acquitted, a mental disorder verdict is not
99. CODIFICATION TEAM REPORT supra note 81, at para. 12.13.
100. Id. at para. 12.14.
101. Id. at para. 12.16.
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appropriate. His "disorder of mind" was caused by the insulin,
an "intoxicant" (see s.26(8)(a)). 1' 0 It was therefore a case of
"intoxication" and not of "mental disorder."'03
Whilst the reasoning contained in this illustration is questionable, 10'
the purpose behind it is clear. The Codification Team has sought to
preserve the distinction between "sane and 'insane' automatism"
10 5
and in doing so has endorsed the reasoning referred to in the previ-
ous section which would give an insulin taker such as Quick'06 an
unqualified acquittal whilst at the same time labelling a forgetful
diabetic like Bailey 0 7 as "mentally disordered" and subject to the
newly proposed special verdict. This distinction, which was criticized
earlier, is so complex and difficult that one is surely justified in ques-
tioning both the propriety and the usefulness of its continued
existence. 08
C. Revision Alternatives - Offering New Directions
A radical solution to the problems mentioned above would be to
abolish the distinction between insane and non-insane automatism
completely.' 0n Indeed, it is interesting to note that this result has in
102. Clause 26(8)(a) of the draft Criminal Code Bill states "'Intoxicant' means alcohol
or any other thing which, when taken into the body, may impair awareness or control." Id. at
186. Clearly, therefore, this definition is wide enough to encompass the use of insulin.
103. Id. at 223, illustration 38(iv).
104. The result favored in illustration 38(iv) seems difficult to support since it cannot be
regarded as a pure case of "intoxication" but is instead "a combination of mental disorder and
intoxication" within clause 38(l) of the draft bill and as such will inevitably qualify in its own
right for the newly proposed mental disorder verdict. It is suggested that this result must
follow since once it is accepted, as it is by the Codification Team in para. 12.14 of their report,
that the diabetic's hypoglycaemic episode is a form of "mental disorder," then the taking of
the insulin cannot prevent the accused's diabetic condition from being classed as an underlying
"mental disorder" which manifests itself when combined with an intoxicant: in this case,
insulin.
105. CODIFICATION TEAM REPORT, supra note 81, at para. 12.16.
106. [1973] 3 All E.R. 347.
107. [1983] 2 All E.R. 503.
108. In an earlier article entitled The Automatism Defence - What Price Rejection?
1983 N.I.L.Q. 81, I concluded at p. 101 "... that there is a need for an automatism defence
which, if successful, should result in an unqualified acquittal." I am now no longer convinced
that this is necessarily correct and consider it necessary to explore alternative approaches as
outlined in the remainder of this paper. Cf. Lederman, supra note 52, at 833-837 who advo-
cates ". . . eliminating the distinction between non-insane and insane automatism by creating
a combined defence for the pleas of insanity and lack of volition."
109. The policy factors which have led the English courts to create the distinction be-
tween sane and insane automatism do not yet seem to have worried the courts or commenta-
tors in the United States. Thus, it is strongly argued there that ". . . the epileptic in a grand
mal whose clonic movements strike and injure another commits no crime; but we need no
special defense of insanity to reach that result, well-established actus reus doctrines suffice."
N. MORRIS, supra note 6, at 65. See also D. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENCE: PHILOSOPHI-
CAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 106 (1983); Hauhart, The Involuntary Action
Defence to a Criminal Indictment II N. Ky. L. REV. 321 (1985); P.H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENCES 267 (1986). 1 intend to address this phenomenon and other matters pertaining
to the use, or more accurately the lack of use, of the automatism plea in the United States on
another occasion.
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fact been achieved by common law development in Scotland where
the High Court of Justiciary has recently confirmed in Carmichael
v. Boyle,110 that any mental disorder short of insanity can only go
towards mitigation. In that case the accused was acquitted of assault
and breach of the peace having been found by the sheriff to have
been suffering from hypoglycemia at the relevant time. The Crown
appealed and in reversing the sheriff's decision Lord Wheatley, The
Lord Justice Clerk, applied the earlier decision of the court in H.M.
Advocate v. Cunningham"' which contains the following principle:
Any mental or pathological condition short of insanity - any
question of diminished responsibility owing to any cause, which
does not involve insanity - is relevant only to the question of
mitigating circumstances and sentence.""' 2
Having similarly approved this proposition, Lord Robertson opined:
If he is not prepared to put forward a special defence of insanity
- with all its consequences - he cannot succeed in obtaining
an acquittal. This is not to say that he might not be able to show
that he was insane at the time by reason of some possibly tem-
porary mental disease, but it is not open to him to seek to estab-
lish some mental or pathological condition short of insanity and
then to ask for acquittal .. . Such a condition is relevant only
to the question of mitigating circumstances and sentence.11
Clearly, therefore, a diabetic in Scotland who suffers from a hypo-
glycemic episode at the time of the alleged offence must plead guilty
or be found legally insane. The inflexibility and potential injustice of
this approach defies comment and has been roundly criticized." 4
However, Scotland is not the only jurisdiction which has adopted
this approach.
For example, Zimbabwe has achieved a broadly similar position
by virtue of section 28(1) of its Mental Health Act 1976, which al-
lows for a special verdict to be returned in cases where the accused
was suffering from "any. . .disorder or disability of mind"' 5 at the
110. 1985 S.L.T. 399. It is interesting to note that Scotland does not accept the
McNaghten Rules but has instead developed its own insanity defence which is based upon
"proof of total alienation of reason in relation to the act charged as a result of mental illness,
mental disease or defect or unsoundess of mind .." per Lord Justice-Clerk MacDonald in
H.M. Advocate v. Brennan, 1977 S.L.T. 151 at 154. For Comment see Mackay, supra note
108, at 89.
111. 1963 S.L.T. 345.
112. Id. at 347.
113. Id. at 406.
114. For critical comment of Carmichael's case see Patrick, Diabetic, Drunk and Disor-
dered: The "Dole Dilemmas"? 1986 J. L. Soc. OF SCOTLAND 72. For detailed general criti-
cism of the Scottish position see Mackay, The Automatism Defence - What Price Rejection?
1983 N.I.L.Q. 81, 84-94.
115. For critical comment, see Mackay, id. at 94-97.
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time of the alleged offense. Thus, the special verdict has been re-
turned in cases of concussion"' and sleepwalking. 1 7 However, in
their most recent pronouncement on this question the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe in the State v. Evans'1 sought to make a dis-
tinction between an automaton and a person who had suffered from
a black-out. The facts of the case were that the accused was con-
victed of culpable homicide after a collision between two trains, one
of which had been driven by the accused who claimed to have suf-
fered from a black-out at the time. The magistrates rejected this
defense because of lack of evidence but also ruled that, if estab-
lished, it could only lead to a special verdict. On this latter point the
Supreme Court held that the magistrates had "confused cases of au-
tomatism with the instant case involving a black-out. On the peculiar
facts of the instant case a special verdict ... would have been
wrong." 119 The basis of this distinction is that a black-out, where
there is no action at all, is somehow different from automatism
where the accused, whose mind is disabled by injuries to the head,
acts in a state of sane automatism. Whilst the latter will qualify for
the special verdict, the former will not. All that can really be said of
such reasoning is that although it may have succeeded in extricating
the accused from the clutches of the special verdict in this particular
case, the distinction in question nevertheless seems every bit as com-
plex and arbitrary as the insane/non-insane automatism dichotomy
in English law.
Clearly, the prospect of ridding the law of distinctions of this
type is inherently attractive. There is no doubt, however, that the
unqualified acquittal resulting from a successful non-insane automa-
tism plea has led to considerable worries on the part of the English
courts and was the fundamental reason for the approach taken by
the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland.
A possible solution to these problems which has not yet received
serious consideration in England would be to widen the scope of any
new special verdict to encompass the existing law on automatism.
This would not be to deny the existence of automatism as a legal
concept as it could continue to be specifically recognized within any
new legislative framework. However, such a result could only be
achieved by completely altering the scope of any new special verdict
as it would now have to accommodate both sane and insane automa-
tism. An obvious problem with this approach is that an unqualified
acquittal would no longer be possible after any successful automa-
116. R v. Senekal, 1969 (4) S.A. 478.
117. S v Ncube 1978 (I) S.A. 1178.
118. [1985] L.R.C. (Crim.) 504.
119. Id. at 516 (per Dumbutshena C.J.).
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tism plea. To many English lawyers this might seem like a retro-
grade step.120 But, provided the new law allowed for complete flexi-
bility of disposal, as is proposed by the Butler Report, then this
would ensure that those automatons whose conditions were merely
transitory and who do not require any form of treatment or supervi-
sion could be released immediately. This then would be almost tan-
tamount to an outright acquittal. It is interesting to note that this
sensible position already exists within the Penal Code of Hawaii
which provides not only that involuntary action excludes responsibil-
ity 1 but also ensures that any such acquittal is not unqualified but
is instead subject to complete flexibility of disposal, including the
power to discharge the defendant unconditionally if "he no longer
presents a danger to himself or the person or property of others and
is not in need of care, supervision, or treatment.""' 2
Another major problem with this approach concerns the ques-
tion of stigma. This point does not appear to have worried those ju-
risdictions in the United States which have opted for change, since
almost without exception' 2 ' the term insanity or some other similar
label has continued to figure largely in the special verdict or its alter-
natives. Of course, since the jury's verdict in Hinckley, the stigma
which a successful insanity plea brings with it may be regarded as
entirely appropriate in the United States."" However, the same is
not true in England where it is generally accepted that the sooner we
remove the word insanity from our legal vocabulary the better." 5
120. I, myself, was originally of this opinion, see Mackay supra note 114, at 101.
121. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-200 (1976).
122. Id. § 704-411. See also the commentary on § 704-400 which at 262 states,
Chapter 704 provides for a unified treatment of diseases, disorders, and de-
fects which constitute an excusing condition. The same standards are provided
for determining whether the condition of the accused will relieve him of respon-
sibility for his acts - it matters not that the condition is labelled "mental" or
"'physical" or both. At the same time the Code in subsequent sections of this
chapter provides for a flexible disposition of defendants acquitted on the basis of
a disease, disorder or defect which excludes responsibility and, therefore, liabil-
ity. The disposition is tailored to the condition of the accused; if the condition
demands custodial commitment, the same will be ordered notwithstanding the
fact that the condition is primarily 'physical' rather than 'mental;' if the condi-
tion does not demand commitment and conditional release or discharge are ap-
propriate, the same will be ordered notwithstanding the fact that the condition
has been labelled 'mental disease or disorder'.
123. Cf. the State of Oregon which since Hinckley has altered the wording of its special
verdict from "not responsible" to "guilty except for insanity." See OREGON REV. STAT. §
161.295 (1983).
124. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1982), where during the course of
delivering the opinion of the Court Justice Powell remarks at p. 367, note 16, "A criminal
defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict
itself, and thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect." The initial ques-
tion of course is whether it is morally proper to stigmatize such an acquittee by retaining
highly prejudicial and archaic concepts such as "insanity," "madness," "craziness" or the like.
125. See, e.g., BUTLER REPORT supra note 80, para. 18.18. ". . . the continued use of
the words 'insanity' and 'insane' in the criminal law long after their disappearance from psy-
chiatry and mental health has been a substantial source of difficulty, and we attach importance
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Such a move would undoubtedly assist in destigmatizing the special
verdict. But to replace "insanity" with the phrase "mental disorder"
retains a degree of stigma which still seems unacceptable. As an il-
lustration of this the decision in R. v. Clarke"' is useful. In that case
the accused's absentmindedness caused by mild depression resulted
in an unqualified acquittal for theft on the basis of a simple denial of
"mens rea." There seems little doubt that under the Butler Report
and the Code provisions, Mrs. Clarke would qualify for the newly
proposed mental disorder verdict. There is a clear danger here that
Mrs. Clarke, like Mr. Sullivan, the epileptic, might prefer to plead
guilty rather than be labelled as "mentally disordered." '127 Professor
Griew counters this problem of stigma by stating:
What must develop is an appreciation that the expression
"mental disorder" in the verdict refers only to an impairment of
function at the time of the act, and that the impairment may be
of no terrible significance . . . .There will be a job of public
education to be done in this connection - including the re-edu-
cation of the legal profession. "
However, it must be open to considerable doubt whether any degree
of public education can have this destigmatizing effect. In addition,
the stigma problem becomes even more acute if, as has been sug-
gested, all cases of automatism were to be collapsed into a new spe-
cial verdict. It is submitted, therefore, that it becomes imperative
that a more neutral term be found so that defendants who are mildly
depressed or diabetic or who suffer from isolated epileptic fits should
not be reluctant to seek a special verdict because of some psychiatric
label attached to it, such as "mental disorder."
A tentative proposal for such a revised special verdict could be
based upon the following notion: "that the accused be found not
to the discontinuance of the use of these words in the criminal law." See also CODIFICATION
TEAM REPORT supra note 81, at para. 12.14 ". . . the offensive label of 'insanity' will no
longer be used. So the verdict should not seem preposterous in the way that its present coun-
terpart does."
126. [1972] 1 All E.R. 219. The reasons for Mrs. Clarke's appeal are succinctly put by
Ackner L.J. at p. 221 as follows:
Because the assistant recorder ruled that the defence put forward had to be
put forward as a defence of insanity, although the medical evidence was to the
effect that it was absurd to call anyone in the appellant's condition insane, de-
fending counsel felt constrained to advise the appellant to alter her plea from not
guilty to guilty so as to avoid the disastrous consequences of her defence, as
wrongly defined by the assistant recorder, succeeding. Thus the appellant in the
case ultimately pleaded guilty solely by reason of the assistant recorder's ruling
* The conviction is accordingly quashed.
127. It should not be thought that the facts leading to the decision in R v. Clarke, id.
are a rare occurrence. For example, in research conducted by the present writer at Leicester
Crown Court over a two year period there were five cases almost identical to Clarke which
resulted in acquittal and three cases where similar defences were unsuccessful. See Mackay,
Psychiatric Reports in the Crown Court, 1986 CRIM. L. REV. 217, 220.
128. Griew, supra note 83, at 52.
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guilty on account of an aberration of normal mental functioning pre-
sent at the time of the commission of the alleged offence." This
would have the merit of demedicalizing and depsychiatrizing the
new verdict as well as spelling out that the "aberration" was present
at the time when the alleged offense was committed. This last point
is not unimportant since it would serve as a reminder that the "aber-
ration" in question may have been an isolated and/or transitory im-
pairment of "normal mental functioning" which is no longer present
at the time of the trial. In short, an express reference in this newly
proposed special verdict that the court is necessarily concerned with
an inquiry into a "past" mental condition on the defendant's part
may in its own small way assist in the destigmatization process. For
without this express reference there may be a continued tendency to
assume that the condition in question is both present and operative
at the time of the trial; an assumption which must inevitably be fos-
tered by the wording and inflexible disposal consequences of the spe-
cial verdict as it presently exists in English law.
Naturally, the precise scope of a defense based upon the notion
of "an aberration of normal mental functioning" would have to be
carefully considered and inevitably this raises once again the com-
plex question of the proper ambit of any such plea. In this connec-
tion, it is submitted that English law should eschew any attempt to
expressly include a volitional limb within any new test. Not only be-
cause of the difficulty of distinguishing between resistible and irresis-
tible impulses, 129 a task which juries have been required to under-
take when considering the English diminished responsibility plea, 130
129. See, e.g., BUTLER REPORT supra note 39, para. 18.16. The English courts have
consistently refused to accept irresistible impulse as a part of the test of insanity within the
McNaghten Rules, see, e.g., R v Kopsch, 19 Crim. App. 50 (1925); R v. True, 16 Crim. App.
164 (1922); R v. Sodeman [1936] 2 All E.R. 1138 (P.C.); Attorney General for South Austra-
lia v. Brown [1960] A.C. 432, (P.C.).
130. The classic statement on the role of irresistible impulse in diminished responsibility
is to be found in the judgment of Lord Parker C.J. in the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision
in R v. Byrne [1960] 3 All E.R. I, where he said:
'Abnormality of mind', which has to be contrasted with the time-honoured
expression in the McNaghten Rules 'defect of reason', means a state of mind so
different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would
term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's activi-
ties in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and
the ability to form a rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also
the ability to exercise will-power to control physical acts in accordance with that
rational judgment. The expression 'mental responsibility for his acts' points to a
consideration of the extent to which the accused's mind is answerable for his
physical acts which must include a consideration of the extent of his ability to
exercise will-power to control his physical acts ....
Furthermore, in a case where the abnormality of mind is one which affects
the accused's self-control, the step between 'he did not resist his impulse' and 'he
could not resist his impulse' is, as the evidence in this case shows, one which is
incapable of scientific proof. A fortiori, there is no scientific measurement of the
degree of difficulty which an abnormal person finds in controlling his impulses.
These problems, which in the present state of medical knowledge are scientifi-
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but also because I am far from convinced that any defect of the
volition or will should of itself be capable of giving rise to an acquit-
tal, albeit a special one. In this respect, the plea of diminished re-
sponsibility, which reduces murder to manslaughter, is a more ap-
propriate vehicle for a consideration of questions surrounding
volition and the exercise of will-power than any newly formulated
defense giving rise to a special verdict. 131
Of course, "the difficult task is to craft a cognitive test for legal
insanity that excuses those who are fundamentally irrational without
allowing spurious claims to succeed"' 1 2 as well as a test which can
be readily understood by a jury. Whilst the term "aberration of nor-
mal mental functioning" could perhaps be adapted in such a way as
to encompass the present law or the Butler proposals based on the
absence of "mens rea," as alternative tests the following are
suggestions:
(a) A defendant will be found not guilty on account of an
aberration of normal mental functioning present at the time of
the commission of the offense if, at that time, he was in a state
of automatism or his normal mental functioning was otherwise
so aberrant that he failed to appreciate what he was doing and
as a result ought to be acquitted.
or
(b) A defendant will be found not guilty on account of an
aberration of normal mental functioning present at the time of
the commission of the alleged offense if, at that time, he was in
a state of automatism or his normal mental functioning was oth-
erwise so aberrant and affected his criminal behaviour to such a
substantial degree that he ought to be acquitted.
cally insoluble, the jury can only approach in a broad, common-sense way ....
It appears to us that the learned judge's direction to the jury that the de-
fence under s 2 of the Act was not available, amounted to a direction that diffi-
culty or even inability of an accused person to exercise will-power to control his
physical acts could not amount to such abnormality of mind as substantially
impaired his mental responsibility. For the reasons which we have already ex-
pressed, we think that this construction of the Act is wrong. Inability to exercise
will-power to control physical acts, provided that it is due to abnormality of
mind from one of the causes specified in the parenthesis in the subsection, is, in
our view, sufficient to entitle the accused to the benefit of the section; difficulty
in controlling his physical acts, depending on the degree of difficulty, may be. It
is for the jury to decide on the whole of the evidence whether such inability or
difficulty has, not as a matter of scientific certainty but on the balance of
probabilities, been established and, in the case of difficulty, whether the difficulty
is so great as to amount in their view to a substantial impairment of the ac-
cused's mental responsibility for his acts. The direction in the present case thus
withdrew from the jury the essential determination of fact which it was their
province to decide.
131. For crimes other than murder, with its mandatory penalty of life imprisonment,
defects of volition may of course quite properly be taken into consideration during sentencing.
For examples of this see MACKAY. THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS IN THE CROWN
COURT TRAIL PROCESS, 9-10 (Leicester Polytechnic Law School Monograph, England 1986).
132. Morse, supra note 5, at 811.
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Although the second test is wider in scope than the first it is submit-
ted that either would allow for the revised special verdict to be re-
turned only in cases where there was a fundamental lack of or reduc-
tion of mental functioning at the time of the alleged offense. In
addition, it is submitted that either test would be readily comprehen-
sible to a jury. The reasons for this are threefold. First, neither test
is clouded by pseudo-psychiatric concepts. Second, the phrase "nor-
mal mental functioning" is one which a jury could readily identify
with and which needs no elaboration or explanation. Third, the word
"aberration" can be explained to a jury by merely using the diction-
ary definition, which includes the following, "deviation from normal;
mental irregularity; lapse from a sound mental state."1 33 Thereafter
the problem, as in all tests governing criminal responsibility, is one
of deciding whether the accused falls within the parameters of the
relevant test. In some cases this may be an easy decision for the jury
to make whilst in others it may be much more difficult. However,
both the suggested tests are an attempt at an uncomplicated ap-
proach which should give to the jury clear guidance as to what is
required of them.
Finally, a crucial question is whether the rejection of a defense
of non-insane automatism which can presently give rise to an un-
qualified acquittal, is too great a price to pay for the eradication of
an illogical and unsatisfactory distinction which continues to plague
English criminal law."" Whilst it is felt that the benefits to be de-
rived from such a rejection outweigh the advantages of retaining the
plea of non-insane automatism: even if this argument proves unsuc-
cessful, it can only be hoped that if and when English Law chooses
to revise the McNaghten Rules a primary goal will be to implement
a workable new special verdict which defendants will not feel reluc-
tant to seek either because of worry about stigma or through fear of
inflexibility of disposal. In short, the old adage, sometimes voiced in
English legal circles, that "no one in his right mind pleads insanity"
needs to be interred along with the McNaghten Rules the existence
of which continue to give it a hollow ring of truth.
133. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (New York 1979).
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY Vol. I, (Oxford U.P. 1970) includes within its definition
of aberration,"... an abnormal state of intellectual faculty; deficiency or partial alienation of
reason."
134. The level of litigation in automatism in English criminal law remains unabated.
See, e.g., the two recent decisions in R v. Blair (available Feb. 25, 1985, on Lexis, Enggen
library); Broome v. Perkins, CO/184/86 (available Oct. 31, 1986, on Lexis, Enggen library),
both of which concern the concept of "unconscious" within the framework of the non-insane
automatism defense. For recent Canadian cases on automatism see, e.g, R v Jacobson (1985)
61 Alta 254; R v. Irvin (1985) 34 M.V.R. 302 (B.C. Co. Ct.); R v. Hachey (1985) 66
N.B.R.2d 146 (N.B. Cit. App.); R v. Chetwynd (1987) 74 N.S.R 2d 75 (N.S. Sup. Ct.).
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